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WALLING OUT:                                 
RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE 
BEACH ACCESS CONTEXT 
TIMOTHY M. MULVANEY* 
The overwhelming majority of U.S. states facially allocate exclusionary 
rights and access privileges to beaches by categorically deciding whom to 
wall in and whom to wall out. In the conventional terms of the longstanding 
debate surrounding the design of legal directives, such “rules” are 
considered substantively determinant ex ante and, in application, 
analogically transparent across similarly situated cases. Only a small 
number of jurisdictions have adopted “standards” in the beach access 
context, which—again, on the conventional account—sacrifice both 
determinacy and transparency for the ability to accommodate ex post the 
complexities of individual cases. This Article contends that beach access 
policy illustrates the familiar limitations of this conventional rules-versus-
standards account in two elucidating ways. First, the implementation of 
contemporary beach access law suggests that the gap between rules and 
standards with respect to the virtue of determinacy is not nearly as wide as 
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the conventional account allows. In short, beach access rules are not and 
cannot in actuality be divorced from context, while beach access standards 
take shape through applications that reveal core archetypes. Second, while 
beach access rules reflect the virtue of transparency in the sense that they 
minimize some forms of arbitrariness, standards offer their own, robust 
version of transparency, which is grounded in promoting dialogue and 
demanding accountability. The Article offers these contentions not to press 
the view that standards are necessarily superior to rules en masse, but, 
instead, to prompt reflection on the nearly uniform and seemingly impulsive 
rule fetishism that has held sway in the beach access context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Proponents of erecting walls—both real and figurative—to address 
myriad issues, from immigration to pollution to trade, often turn to the 
proverb “good fences make good neighbors” brought to prominence in 
Robert Frost’s 1962 poem, Mending Wall.1 Frost’s work, though, is no more 
 
 1. See, e.g., Charles Selle, ‘Walling in or Walling out’ Is Folly We Can’t Afford, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 
23, 2019, 10:40 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/lake-county-news-sun/opinion/ct-lns-
selle-trump-wall-st-0124-story.html [perma.cc/CB2L-WQ9L]. 
1_MULVANEY_JCI_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/21  9:51 PM 
2020] WALLING OUT 3 
 
a polemic plea for building walls than an impassioned appeal against them. 
The narrator in the poem, engaged in conversation with a fellow farmer, is 
instead in search of reasons for and against the annual ritual of rebuilding 
the loose-stone barriers that characterized much of the early twentieth 
century New England landscape. “Before I built a wall,” suggests the 
narrator, “I’d ask to know [w]hat I was walling in or walling out, [a]nd to 
whom I was like to give offense.”2 
Today, the overwhelming majority of U.S. states facially allocate 
exclusionary rights and access privileges to privately-titled dry sand beaches 
by categorically deciding whom to wall in and whom to wall out.3 In a great 
many jurisdictions, waterfront titleholders seemingly can exclude from the 
beach all comers in all instances without cause; in select others, they are 
categorically precluded from constraining third-party access to the beach 
regardless of the circumstances. In the conventional terms of the debate 
surrounding the design of legal directives, such “rules” are considered 
substantively determinant ex ante and, in application, analogically 
transparent across similarly situated cases. Only a small number of 
jurisdictions have adopted beach access “standards,” which, consistent with 
the Mending Wall narrator’s counsel, more flexibly engage in reasoning ex 
post that is sensitive to the complexities of individual cases. Standards do so, 
though, only—again, in accord with conventional terms—at the sacrifice of 
determinacy and transparency. 
This Article contends that beach access policy illustrates the familiar 
limitations of the conventional rules-versus-standards account in two 
elucidating ways. First, the implementation of contemporary beach access 
law suggests that the gap between rules and standards with respect to the 
virtue of determinacy is not nearly as wide as the conventional account 
allows. Second, while rules reflect the virtue of transparency in the sense that 
they minimize some forms of arbitrariness, standards offer their own, robust 
version of transparency. 
Part I elicits the first claim through a historically sensitive charting of 
three overarching approaches to beach access: robust exclusionary rights, 
 
 2. Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED POEMS, 
COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 33–34 (Edward Connery Latham ed., 1969). 
 3. Lands flowed by the tide are owned by the state and impressed with a public trust for the benefit 
of all. See generally COASTAL STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK (2d 
ed. 1997). Public ownership in tidal waterways extends up to the mean high-tide line in most states, 
though select states limit public ownership to the area seaward of the low-tide line. See James M. Kehoe, 
The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as Trustees of Public Trust Properties, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916 (1995). This Article concentrates on access to and use of beaches landward 
of those operative lines demarcating strict public ownership. 
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unfettered access privileges, and a reasonable access norm. It suggests that 
interpreting what on their face are the rigid, acontextual rules of robust 
exclusionary rights and unfettered access privileges, respectively, cannot in 
actuality be divorced from context. When new contexts arise, these rules do 
not automatically determine the scope of their own application; instead, 
beachgoers and titleholders reflect on whether the policies underpinning 
those rules apply in a new context and, where necessary, call on judges to 
perform their role of exercising judgment in determining whether to craft an 
exception to the rule, fashion a qualification to it, or recognize a distinction 
by reference to norms and policies that negates its application wholesale. In 
this regard, this Part suggests that these beach access “rules” are not wholly 
distinct from what, on their face, are those more open-ended “standards” 
protecting reasonable access that take shape through applications that reveal 
core archetypes. 
Part II, in advancing the second claim, concedes that rule-like 
approaches have been appropriately lauded for their transparency in that they 
require decisionmakers to treat like cases alike and thereby minimize some 
forms of arbitrariness or bias. However, the Part submits that standard-based 
approaches offer their own version of transparency—one grounded in 
promoting dialogue, demanding accountability, and insisting on 
justification—that is also of great import. On this latter version, rules might 
be characterized by a lack of transparency if controversies are allegedly 
decided by application or nonapplication of a rule based on a blanket 
assertion of what that rule entails while the actual reasons for deciding 
whether a hard case is within or outside the rule go unexpressed. 
Highlighting the determinacy and transparency features of standards is 
not offered here to press the ultimate claim that, in all circumstances, 
standards necessarily are superior to rules, standards necessarily reveal value 
judgments, or rules necessarily suppress or conceal those judgments. Rather, 
the Article concludes more modestly with the hope that developing an 
understanding of these features will prompt reflection on the near uniformity 
and seeming impulsivity of the rule fetishism that has held sway in the beach 
access context to date. 
I.  RULES AND STANDARDS: DETERMINACY 
Even where codified through legislation or administrative regulations 
on coastal permitting, policies regarding access to and use of dry sand 
beaches in most U.S. states largely have their roots in interpretations of the 
common law doctrines of implied dedication, prescription, custom, and the 
public trust. Beach access in a vast majority of states construes each of these 
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common law doctrines in narrow terms by recognizing robust exclusionary 
rights in those who hold title to dry sand beaches. Select outliers offer 
broader readings of these common law doctrines, and thereby afford 
unfettered access privileges or reasonable access. Though laws respecting 
unfettered access privileges are similar to reasonable access approaches in 
their relatively expansive view of the public’s interest in accessing beaches, 
they mirror the law in those jurisdictions respecting robust exclusionary 
rights in terms of their lack of patent attention to context. 
Drawing on the historical development of beach access policy in three 
states—Texas, Oregon, and New Jersey—as illustrative of the three alternate 
approaches outlined above, this Part proceeds in three Sections. The first 
Section explains that, in the conventional terms of the long-running rules-
versus-standards debate, Texas’s and Oregon’s approaches reflect “rules” 
that are determinate ex ante but have the propensity to be over- and under-
inclusive given the irreducible complexity and evolving nature of our moral 
perspectives and policy goals.4 It then critiques this view on the grounds that 
beach access rules cannot in actuality be divorced from context, for the rules 
themselves do not determine whether they are applicable in every 
conceivable factual circumstance. The second Section asserts that beach 
access rules—again, in conventional terms—are distinct from the types of 
“standards” on which New Jersey’s approach rests, the latter of which can 
more flexibly and purposively accommodate complex and evolving 
perspectives and goals at the sacrifice of determinacy.5 It then critiques this 
view on the grounds that standards take shape through applications in 
archetypical cases. The Part concludes in a third Section that the rule-based 
and standards-based approaches to beach access are, in actuality, far more 
similar than the traditional “determinacy of rules” and “flexibility of 
standards” descriptions allow. 
A.  “RULES” ON THE BEACHFRONT 
This Section articulates the historical development of what on their face 
are, respectively, the exclusionary and unfettered access “rules” of Texas and 
Oregon, respectively. Thereafter, it questions these rules’ supposed 
determinacy upon reflection as to how they have been applied by courts in 
 
 4. See John A. Lovett, Love, Loyalty and the Louisiana Civil Code: Rules, Standards and Hybrid 
Discretion in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 72 LA. L. REV. 923, 931–41 (2012) (describing the conventional 
positions); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257, 267–71 (1974) (same); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1694–99, 1739 (1976) (same). 
 5. See Lovett, supra note 4, at 931–41. 
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individual cases. 
1.  Robust Exclusion 
Prior to Texas’s gaining independence, Mexican law prohibited the 
colonization of the lengthy stretch of beach along Galveston Island—a 
stretch that today is within geographical reach for more Texans than any 
other given its proximity to the city of Houston—without approval of 
Mexico’s President.6 When Texas became a republic in 1836, all lands on 
the island thus were subject to significant public interests. In 1840, the 
Republic granted private title to Galveston’s “West End” to Levi Jones and 
Edward Hall.7 Soon after Texas entered the Union in 1845, the state’s 
legislature confirmed the validity of the grant to Jones and Hall and many 
similar grants statewide.8 
From the date of the Jones and Hall grant, it remained an open question 
which Texas lands above the low tide line, if any, still were impressed, even 
where title rested in private hands, with public interests. In its 1958 decision 
in Luttes v. State, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim that, 
under the public trust doctrine, these lands included the dry sand beach; 
instead, it held that public trust rights existed only in those lands seaward of 
the mean high-tide line.9 A year later, the Texas legislature passed a statute 
purporting to establish enforcement procedures for instances in which the 
state acquires an access easement to beach area landward of the mean high-
tide line via the common law doctrines of prescription, implication, and 
custom.10 For several decades, state appellate courts conceived of these 
common law easements quite broadly, and many dry-sand beaches titled in 
private hands were thereby considered accessible to the public.11 In 2011, 
though, the Texas Supreme Court in Severance v. Patterson12 reduced what 
had come to be known as the 1959 “Open Beaches Act” to a misnomer. 
According to Severance, every dry-sand beach in Texas that today is 
titled in private hands actually is closed to the public unless the state proves 
 
 6. General Law of Colonization, art. 4 (Mex., Aug. 18, 1824), reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, 
THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822–1897, at 97 (1898). 
 7. Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 716 (Tex. 2012). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 169, 181 (Tex. 1958). 
 10. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.001(8) (West 2019).  
 11. See, e.g., Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (finding 
an implied dedication “of the area seaward from the seaward side of the line of vegetation to the line of 
mean high tide” to members of the public where successive owners “generally” allowed the public—at 
least beyond a four year period in which a fence existed—“to use the beach each year”). 
 12.  Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 705. 
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the impossible: that, upon the lapsing of the extensive statute of limitations 
afforded under the common law doctrines referenced in the Act, it has 
acquired a public easement across a strip of sand that, in effect, is fixed to 
specific metes and bounds.13 The impossibility of the state’s meeting this 
burden results from two inter-related realities. First, the locations of the 
vegetation line and the mean high-tide line (and, thus, the dry-sand beach 
between the two) vary—sometimes markedly—most every year as a result 
of coastal storms. Despite this variability, Severance focuses not on the 
purpose of a public beach easement but, instead, its geographical 
coordinates, going so far as to require the public to reestablish any previously 
acquired easement simply because the precise grains of sand underfoot have 
changed.14 Second, per Severance, where the state does not currently hold a 
common law easement, private owners can construct physical barriers to the 
public’s accessing Texas beaches, and thereby foreclose the establishment 
of a new public easement or the reestablishment of any preexisting public 
easement in perpetuity.15 In imposing on the state a burden that it could never 
meet, the state supreme court’s interpretation and articulation of Texas law 
effectively extended to coastal titleholders the right to wall out the public at 
their will. 
Texas’s approach assumes that a “single” owner of every oceanfront 
parcel can be identified and that these owners have near absolute power to 
control the dry sand sitting within the metes and bounds of their deeds. The 
robust exclusionary rights afforded these owners are not filtered in terms of 
the instances in which autonomy is exercised out of a desire to protect one’s 
legitimate interests in, for example, preserving privacy or ensuring security, 
or, alternatively, out of a desire to dominate or isolate others.16 On this view, 
owners’ autonomy cannot be limited except, perhaps, in the most extreme 
and temporary circumstances of necessity.17 
 
 13. Id. at 708, 714–15 (noting that “the dry beach often is privately owned” and rejecting the claim 
that the public can acquire an easement thereon—by prescription, dedication, custom, or otherwise—that 
“can ‘roll’ from a parcel previously encumbered . . . to a distinct parcel not so encumbered . . . [or] from 
one portion of a parcel to another part of the same parcel”). 
 14. See, e.g., Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in 
Coastal Texas: Current Status of the Law After Severance v. Patterson, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365, 
382–83 (2011); see also Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future 
Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 353–54 (2010). 
 15. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 719 (interpreting the Open Beaches Act to “prohibit[] anyone from 
creating, erecting, or constructing any ‘obstruction, barrier, or restraint that will interfere with the free 
and unrestricted right of the public’ to access Texas beaches where the public has acquired a right of use 
or easement” (emphasis added)). 
 16. See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 154 (2009). 
 17. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1_MULVANEY_JCI_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/21  9:51 PM 
8 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1 
 
2.  Unfettered Access 
An Oregon statute passed in 1967 allows for a perpetual public 
easement to “free and uninterrupted use” of all privately-owned dry sand 
beaches along the state’s 362-mile coastline.18 Contra Texas’s approach, 
Oregon’s approach envisions the beach as offering a particularly special 
forum for sociability.19 Oregon’s legislation sets forth no illusions that “the 
anonymity of the bathing suit” creates marked opportunities for especially 
meaningful interactions across status groups; publicly accessible beaches 
cannot, in and of themselves, serve as a mystic cure for a highly stratified 
society.20 However, it reflects an understanding of beaches as providing a 
platform, if even for only the most casual perfunctory exchanges, for people 
of different backgrounds and circumstances, borrowing the words of 
Gregory Alexander, “to meet and engage with each other as concrete persons 
rather than as imagined others.”21 
The Oregon Supreme Court blessed the Oregon legislature’s approach 
in 1969 in the face of a challenge by an owner who sought to wall off the 
 
889, 941 (2009) (referring to temporary entry in situations of dire necessity); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems 
with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 962 (1995) (“It is familiar to find rules that have explicit or implicit 
exceptions for cases of necessity or emergency. It is unfamiliar to find rules without any such 
exceptions.”). 
 18. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 674 (Or. 1969). Only Hawaii grants similar public 
rights. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Haw. 1968).  
 19. See James Freeman, Democracy and Danger on the Beach: Class Relations in the Public Space 
of Rio de Janeiro, 5 SPACE & CULTURE 9, 19 (Feb. 2002). Sociability refers to our capacity “to recognize 
and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; [and] to be 
able to imagine the situation of another.” See Martha Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities, 
20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21, 23 (2007). 
 20. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 19; see also Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm 
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 805–07 (2009). 
 21. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 196–98 (2018) (suggesting 
that accessible public spaces offer the educative promise of “indiscriminate . . . mingling”); Alexander 
Gazikas, The Low Water Mark for Beach Access: Defending Government Protection of Intertidal 
Recreation as a Lawful Exercise of State Power, 17 U.N.H. L. REV. 287, 302 (2019) (referring to beaches 
as serving an “equalizing function”); Marc R. Poirier, Modified Private Property: New Jersey’s Public 
Trust Doctrine, Private Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15 
SE. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 103 (2006) (“Public places open to all have an important benefit, though one 
intangible and difficult to quantify—they civilize us.”); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: 
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779 (1986) (“[R]ecreation 
can be a socializing and educative influence.”); Bethany Berger, Takings at the Water’s Edge (working 
paper) (on file with author) (describing waterfront lands as “the gathering places of the world” and “an 
outlet for ever more crowded and atomized residents to meet”). This perspective rings of Frederick Law 
Olmstead’s assertion in the mid-nineteenth century that public parks offer space for socialization and 
educational influence across socioeconomic classes. See FREDERICK OLMSTEAD, Public Parks and the 
Enlargement of Towns, in CIVILIZING AMERICAN CITIES: A SELECTION OF FREDERICK LAW OLMSTEAD’S 
WRITINGS ON CITY LANDSCAPES 74–81 (S. Sutton ed., 1971).  
1_MULVANEY_JCI_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/21  9:51 PM 
2020] WALLING OUT 9 
 
beach in front of his coastal resort for his paying guests.22 In Thornton v. 
Hay, the court found that the “first European settlers on [present-day 
Oregon’s] shores” found the “aboriginal inhabitants” accessing and using the 
beach for a variety of purposes and that the “newcomers” had continued 
these customs through “actual practice[]” since statehood.23 While the court 
said that the available evidence likely was sufficient to hold that the public 
had acquired an easement to this specific resort owner’s beach by 
prescription, it pointed to the “unbroken” custom of beach use statewide in 
concluding that all of “the dry-sand area along the Pacific shore” is subject 
to a public easement.24 By apparently allocating a property right to everyone 
in the state to go to the beach of his or her choosing, Oregon’s beach access 
law crafts a social life quite distinct from that created under Texas’s approach 
by offering each person an expansive range of recreational and socialization 
options. 
3.  Rules and Determinacy 
Rules akin to Texas’s robust exclusionary command and Oregon’s 
unfettered access policy generally are lauded for their determinacy.25 
However, in actuality, such rules are only easy to apply—and thus only 
determinate—in easy cases. These rules do not automatically determine the 
scope of their own application when hard cases inevitably come along.26 
 
 22. Thornton, 462 P.2d at 673. 
 23. Id. at 673–74. 
 24. Id. at 676–77; see also Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993) 
(holding that Oregon’s customary public rights in ocean beaches precluded a takings claim challenging 
regulations limiting development on beaches titled in private parties);  
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 837, 839 (2013) (discussing the 
likes of Stevens in the course of questioning the self-contained nature of the background principles inquiry 
in regulatory takings jurisprudence). Applications of the doctrine of custom ordinarily involve remarking 
on the circumstances and context in which a longstanding use by the non-owning public will transform 
an owner’s right to exclude into a right of access that the public can comfortably expect will continue into 
the future. See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Roma, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974). Yet 
Thornton’s application fulfills the public need to access and use beaches by categorically deeming all 
portions of all beaches in the state open to the public on the rather implausible deduction—at least based 
on the limited record before the court—that the public regularly had accessed each portion of each and 
every one of those beaches in the past. Indeed, in dicta, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized as much 
in a later decision in making the seemingly contradictory assertions that “[w]e do not retreat today from 
anything said in [Thornton]” and “nothing in [Thornton] fairly can be read to have established beyond 
dispute a public claim by virtue of ‘custom’ to the right to recreational use of the entire Oregon coast, no 
matter what the topography of a particular place.” McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (Or. 1989). 
 25. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1688–89; Lovett, supra note 4, at 926; Carol M. Rose, Crystals 
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590–92 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62–63 (1992). 
 26. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property 
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 961; KARL LLEWELLYN, THE 
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Instead, in new contexts litigants force judges to perform the task of 
interpreting rules to determine whether those rules apply.27 For an instructive 
if gruesome example, a New York court famously declined in Riggs v. 
Palmer to follow the decedent’s will, made in due form, stating that all of 
his property would pass to his grandson, Elmer Palmer, when Palmer 
murdered his grandfather to accelerate this inheritance.28  
In performing this interpretive task in a given instance, a judge must 
exercise moral and practical judgment by looking to the reasons the state 
adopted the rule in the first place, the values and norms that rule supposedly 
protects, the consequences it sought to promote, and the situations within 
which it was supposed to operate, as well as any countervailing norms and 
interests that might not have been implicated or obvious in the factual setting 
that led to the creation of the rule in the first place.29 A rule crumbles when 
judges cannot live with the result that mechanical application of that rule in 
a new context dictates.30 In this way, rules and standards are not as distinct 
with regard to determinacy as they appear on the conventional account.31 
In the beach access context, consider, for instance, the acontextual 
 
BRAMBLE BUSH 71 (1930). Mark Kelman goes so far as to say that “all cases are hard cases.” MARK 
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 23 (1987). 
 27. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 817 (1989) 
(“[J]udges are an interpretive community conscious of their obligation to act as independent moral 
choosers for the good of society, in light of what that society is and can become. . . . [T]here are no rules 
that can be understood apart from their context.”). 
28 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889). 
 29. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1369, 1427 (2013). 
 30. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 25, at 578 (“[S]traightforward common law crystalline rules have 
been muddied repeatedly by . . . equitable second-guessing.”); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 54 (“[T]o avoid 
injustice at the margin, legislatures and courts simply invent end-runs around [rules].”); Sunstein, supra 
note 17, at 957 (“Often rules will be too crude, since they run up against intransigent beliefs about how 
particular cases should be resolved.”).  
 31. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1710 (“The different values that people commonly associate 
with the formal modes of rule and standard are conveyed by the emotive or judgmental words that the 
advocates of the two positions use in the course of debate about a particular issue.”); Amnon Lehavi, The 
Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 81, 105 (2010) 
(“Even the most careful legal design would be unable to predict, allocate, and decide in advance all 
possible states-of-the-world regarding the bundle of property rights.”); Lovett, supra note 4, at 937 
(suggesting that, given the blurred nature of rules and standards, the fairness, efficiency, and democratic 
governance justifications for one design versus the other often “dissolve into irreconcilable, and perhaps 
ultimately rhetorical, conflict”); Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 823, 828–32 (1991); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 61 (explaining that the 
“distinctions between rules and standards . . . mark a continuum, not a divide”). Cass Sunstein describes 
the rules-standards continuum as involving progressively more discretionary steps from untrammeled 
discretion (at one pole) to rules to “rules with excuses” to presumptions to factors to standards to 
guidelines (at the other pole). Sunstein, supra note 17, at 960–68. 
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application of Texas’s seemingly robust exclusionary rule if the City of 
Galveston conveyed to private parties all beaches on the island that currently 
are titled in public hands. Strict adherence to this “rule” effectively would 
limit the public’s access to and, thus, use of all lands flowed by the tide of 
the Gulf of Mexico—which, incontrovertibly, are held in trust for the 
public—to those individuals who have access permission from a waterfront 
owner or who can secure access to those lands by water or air transport. 
Consider, too, how an acontextual application of Oregon’s doctrine of 
custom would leave unaddressed the reality that there are longstanding 
practices that, when replicated moving forward, may be contrary to public 
need as conceived in light of changing times and conditions. For a simple 
example, contemplate the claim, levied in some states in the past, that the 
public customarily used the beach for automobile travel.32 Faced with such 
a claim today, it is not evident that judges would be doing their job if they 
cemented the public’s ability to continue this use in perpetuity merely 
because of its historical exercise and without reflection on the purposes of 
the practice and the values served by the perpetuation—or cessation—of it.33 
These hypothetical examples illustrate that determining whether rules 
should apply in hard cases requires standards. The laws in Texas and Oregon 
are, of course, grounded in different presumptions. The essential if implicit 
question, though, in each of these jurisdictions is the same: whether the 
reasons behind the exclusion or access requested are sufficient under the 
circumstances to rebut the standing presumption. Judges who failed to 
acknowledge as much merely would be assuming that “rules” have a built-
in structure that makes them easy to state, and shielding their eyes from their 
unavoidable task of exercising normative judgment, all the while, if 
unintentionally, staking out a normative position.34 Texas judges executing 
their role properly, however, would confront head-on the consequences of a 
purely privatized coastline to determine whether that state of affairs should 
be respected or, instead, excepted from the rule in a given case that may have 
similar though not identical facts. Similarly, Oregon judges executing their 
role properly would confront head-on the evolving understandings of 
environmental science that have illuminated the damage vehicular traffic can 
 
 32. See, e.g., Trepanier v. County of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“Driving and parking on the beach . . . may be viewed as a customary use in its own right based on . . . a 
historic custom of using the beach as a thoroughfare.”). 
 33. But see Sir John Baker, Prescriptive Customs in English Law, 1300–1800, in 33 LIMITATION 
AND PRESCRIPTION (Harry Dondorp, David Ibbetson & Eltjo J. H. Schrage eds., 2019) (noting that, under 
English law, an act declared customary remains so unless and until lifted by statute).  
 34. Judges, therefore, are never “simple rule applier[s].” Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1770. 
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inflict on coastal ecological systems.35 That context matters does not suggest 
that rules are useless; rather, it suggests that rules are useful when tailored to 
circumstances that we have some passable ability to predict the contours 
of—though never with absolute precision—in advance.36 
B.  “STANDARDS” ON THE BEACHFRONT 
This Section—again, with attention to historical developments—
distinguishes the exclusionary and unfettered access rules of, respectively, 
Texas and Oregon from the standards-based framework of New Jersey, the 
latter of which is rooted in the public trust doctrine. It contends that the 
flexibility often attributed to such a standards-based framework is not as 
expansive as the conventional account suggests. 
1.  Reasonable Access 
New Jersey was established in 1664 as a real estate investment 
company, with a grant of property from King Charles II to his brother James, 
the Duke of York.37 James then conveyed those rights to two proprietors, 
Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret.38 Because, under English law, 
the King could not convey any rights that he held in trust for the public, those 
rights were not conveyed to Berkeley and Carteret, but rather were retained 
by the Crown. Accordingly, under the public trust doctrine, no property 
owner in present-day New Jersey ever possessed these rights beyond the 
 
 35. See, e.g., Chelsea Harvey, Why You Really Need to Stop Driving on Beaches, WASH. POST, 
(June 3, 2015, 12:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/06/03/ 
why-you-really-need-to-stop-driving-on-beaches [perma.cc/4CBW-XEF6].  
 36. See Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 55–58 (2012) (explaining 
that the application of rules requires interpretative judgments about the contexts within which that rule 
should apply); Radin, supra note 27, at 809 (“Over time the ‘same’ action in response to the ‘same’ 
directive can go from being compelled by a rule to not being compelled by a rule, or vice versa.”); 
Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1022 (“The need for interpretation during encounters with concrete cases 
means that ex post assessments of some sort are an inescapable part of law.”). 
 37. See Graham v. Township of Edison, 173 A.2d 403, 405 (N.J. 1961). The next several 
paragraphs draw in considerable part from Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, “Waterlocked”: 
Public Access to New Jersey’s Coastline, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579 (2007). 
 38. Berkeley and Carteret had visions of establishing a feudal society in which they would, as the 
land’s lords, collect tributes from its occupants. See Grant of Land from James, Duke of York, to John 
Lord Berkeley, Baron of Straton, & Sir George Carteret (June 24, 1664), 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj01.asp [perma.cc/HH9A-CK93]. That the occupiers later 
successfully resisted Berkeley and Carteret’s oppressive scheme by claiming that they held freehold title 
as a result of their laboring to cultivate and develop the land does not alter the fact that title to all property 
in New Jersey today is based on and can be traced back to these original conveyances from King Charles 
II. See BRENDAN MCCONVILLE, THESE DARING DISTURBERS OF THE PUBLIC PEACE: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
PROPERTY AND POWER IN EARLY NEW JERSEY (1999). It, of course, is the uncomfortable and undeniable 
truth that all “freehold titles” in New Jersey, like the proprietary claims themselves, were created in 
forcible disregard of the interests of the members of the Indian nations who originally lived on the land. 
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reigning monarch of England and, following the transfer of royal rights to 
state legislatures at the close of the Revolutionary War, the State of New 
Jersey itself. 
In its 1821 decision in Arnold v. Mundy, New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized that these public trust rights included access to and use 
of navigable waters and tidal shores for purposes of fishing and transporting 
persons and commercial goods.39 It follows that these public rights protected 
under the public trust doctrine, unless somehow specifically and 
appropriately abrogated by the State with respect to a given parcel in the 
intervening period, sit in the chain of title to all properties that include 
navigable waters or border tidal waterways statewide.40 Thus, where the 
State conveys title to navigable waters or tidal shores to private parties, those 
parties’ interests, per Arnold, generally remain subject to the public’s rights 
of access and use. 
After Arnold, the public trust doctrine case law in New Jersey remained 
relatively quiet through the first half of the twentieth century. During that 
time, the state’s urban waterfronts were densely developed with largely 
industrial uses, while several oceanfront cities with sandy beaches and 
railroad access—such as Asbury Park, Long Branch, Atlantic City, and Cape 
May—grew into popular resorts.41 Outside of these urban areas and resorts, 
though, the state’s beaches remained largely undeveloped and were used 
only for fishing, fowling, and associated activities.42 The New Jersey 
coastline changed rapidly after World War II, though, due to the popularity 
of the automobile and improvements to New Jersey’s highways, including 
the modernization of tunnels from New York City and construction of the 
Garden State Parkway.43 In short order, New Jersey’s entire 128 miles of 
sandy beaches had come within reach of the region’s increasingly prosperous 
middle class.44 
 
 39. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 12 (1821); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 
(1892); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411–12 (1842). 
 40. Some courts seem to suggest that the state may terminate public trust rights by transferring 
public trust property to a private party via a deed that expressly states that the transfer is unencumbered 
by such rights. See, e.g., Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. Rhode Island, 657 A.2d 1038, 
1040 (R.I. 1995). In New Jersey, though, “the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of public 
trust property.” Karam v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 705 A.2d 1221, 1228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998), aff’d 723 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1999); see also Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005) 
(holding that the rights encompassed under the public trust doctrine are inalienable). 
 41. DOMINICK MAZZAGETTI, THE JERSEY SHORE: THE PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE OF A NATIONAL 
TREASURE 65–66, 81–82, 107–09 (2018).  
 42. Id. at 212–14. 
 43. Id. at 260–64. 
 44. Id. at 254. 
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Starting in the 1970s, the state’s courts were called upon more and more 
to resolve disputes between private property owners and the newly expanded 
beach-going public. These courts sided with the public at most every turn. In 
1972, the state’s supreme court recognized that the State owns not only all 
tidal waterways and the underlying submerged lands, but also the shore 
seaward of the mean high-tide line.45 Soon thereafter, it held that a 
municipality may not restrict use of a portion of its beach to its residents.46 
And, a bit later, an appellate court concluded that municipalities may not 
discriminate against nonresidents in their beach fee schedules or other beach 
access or use policies.47 These rulings, the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
explain in its 1984 decision in Matthews v. Bay Head, rested on a perception 
of the public trust doctrine not as a “fixed or static” principle but instead one 
to “be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the 
public it was created to benefit.”48 
The Matthews court made two important declarations: First, public trust 
uses in New Jersey reach beyond fishing and transportation to recreation and 
socialization, and, second, the character of the property at issue, not merely 
the identity of the titleholder as private or public, determines whether and 
the extent to which the public has rights to recreate and socialize landward 
of the mean high-tide line.49 
As to this latter point, the beaches in dispute in Matthews, spanning the 
entire 1.5-mile oceanfront of the Borough of Bay Head, were privately 
owned but managed by a private association—the Bay Head Improvement 
Association (“Association”)—that provided services similar in type and 
scale to those provided by many coastal municipalities.50 The sole purpose 
of the Association was to offer and manage beach access and use for the 
benefit of the Borough’s residents, with Association staff serving as 
lifeguards, maintaining the beach, and selling beach badges required for 
 
 45. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972); see 
also Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881, 886–88 (N.J. 1981). 
 46. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J. 1978); Hyland v. Borough of 
Allenhurst, 393 A.2d 579, 581–82 (N.J. 1978) (concluding that a municipality abused its power by barring 
beachgoers from use of municipally maintained toilet facilities adjacent to a public beach). 
 47. Slocum v. Borough of Belmar, 569 A.2d 312, 317 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (declaring 
a municipality breached its fiduciary duties to the public by raising beach admittance fees rather than 
property taxes to generate revenue solely to benefit its residents and by charging fees that were 
“disproportionately and inequitably” higher on weekends, when mostly nonresidents use the beaches, as 
opposed to lower fees on weekdays when mostly residents use the beaches). 
 48. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984) (quoting 
Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 47). 
 49. Id. at 368–69. 
 50. Id. at 359. 
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entry in the summer months.51 The Borough, in turn, supported the 
Association through cooperative municipal resolutions, free office space, 
tax-exempt real estate, free liability insurance coverage, and public funding 
of beach protection structures.52 
Viewing the Association “in its totality,” including attending to the 
Association’s “purpose, relationship with the municipality, communal 
characteristic, activities, and virtual monopoly over the Bay Head 
beachfront,” the court deemed the entity “quasi-public.”53 On a beach held 
by a quasi-public entity, concluded the court, “[t]he public must be afforded 
reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on 
the dry sand.”54 To determine the extent of public access to and use of the 
dry sand required in this context, Matthews identified several non-exclusive 
considerations that it deemed relevant, including (1) the location of the dry 
sand in relation to the foreshore, (2) the usage of the upland dry sand area by 
the private owner, (3) the extent and availability of publicly owned upland 
dry sand areas in the vicinity, and (4) the nature and extent of the public 
demand.55 
Matthews does not present a formula into which one simply can plug 
defined variables to determine automatically whether a given beach should 
be deemed quasi-public and, if so, the precise extent of public access and use 
that should be available. However, the decision sets an important baseline 
for instances in which private entities and municipalities are intertwined in a 
manner that resembles the symbiotic relationship between the Association 
and the Borough. Moreover, it establishes a framework for contextualized 
judgments in future borderline cases in which private entities might be 
conceived as standing in the shoes of a municipality, if in less complete terms 
than was the case in Matthews itself. Still further, the holding, while saying 
nothing explicit about beaches owned by private parties distinctly 
independent of any government entity, sent an important signal of inclusivity 
on New Jersey’s oceanfront. 
The circumstances surrounding a rather unique non-profit venture 
illustrate both the progress and limitations of Matthews’ concentration on the 
character of the property at issue. In 2002, an ambitious collection of young 
surfers founded an initiative known as the Habitat Paddle to Build that 
ultimately would gain considerable media attention up and down the eastern 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 360. 
 53. Id. at 368. 
 54. Id. at 366. 
 55. Id. at 365. 
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seaboard.56 Over the course of a single month, the group planned to take on 
the grueling task of paddling surfboards the full length of New Jersey’s 
coastline in an effort to raise funds and awareness for the charitable home 
building organization, Habitat for Humanity.57 In advance of the trip, the 
group contacted the U.S. Coast Guard to advise it of their intentions. The 
Coast Guard’s Marine Event Coordinator responded that the group’s plans 
did not implicate federal strictures because the paddling journey would not 
trigger any of the relevant federal criteria relating to vessel size, water quality 
protections, or shipping interference.58 This official did, though, close his 
letter with a reminder that the paddlers’ efforts would need to be conducted 
in accord with all “state and local law and regulation that applies during the 
time and at the location of the event.”59 
Based on a first-hand account of one of the paddlers, who penned a daily 
journal of the trek for a New Jersey newspaper, it is readily apparent that it 
was the Matthews line of state and local law and regulation to which the 
group had been referred by the Coast Guard that allowed the project to 
succeed.60 The group spent four weeks traversing across beaches to get to 
the water; walking the shores with a Habitat for Humanity banner; and 
routinely stopping for a rest, a snack, or to chat about the organization’s 
mission with thousands of locals and visitors alike on myriad beaches, 
including those of Bay Head and multiple other towns with quasi-public 
beach management arrangements akin to that at issue in Matthews.61 By and 
large, the paddlers’ access to and use of New Jersey’s beaches was welcomed 
with open arms.62 
The group did, though, encounter stretches of beach that had been 
walled off to the public by the gates and security guards of privately-owned 
oceanfront homes, hotels, condominiums, and beach clubs. In some of these 
instances, the paddlers were able to gain permission from the owners to step 
onto the beach; in others, they stayed in the water and the area flowed by the 
 
 56. See, e.g., “Habitat Paddle to Build” A Very Worthy Cause, ASBURY PARK PRESS, June 4, 2006, 
at H14; Katia Raina, Friends Paddle N.J. Coast to Help Habitat for Humanity, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, 
July 13, 2002, at C1; Suzanne Zionts, Surf Group Raises Money to Build Homes for Needy, COURIER-
POST, July 4, 2002, at 5B. 
 57. See Zionts, supra note 56. 
 58. Letter from Geoffrey M. Pagels, Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Event 
Coordinator, to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. 
A&M Sch. of Law (February 10, 2002) (on file with author). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Habitat Paddle to Build Journal Series, OCEAN COUNTY OBSERVER, June 30, 2002–July 28, 
2002 (on file with author). 
 61. See id.; Zionts, supra note 56. 
 62. Habitat Paddle to Build Journal Series, supra note 60. 
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tide; and, in still others, they were forced to pack up the team van and drive, 
sometimes a sizable distance, to the next public access point.63 Several years 
after the conclusion of their journey, the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
issue its landmark beach access decision in a case, Raleigh Avenue Beach 
Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., involving one such private enclave.64 
The dispute in Raleigh Avenue had begun unexceptionally with local 
resident Anthony Labrosciano exiting the area flowed by the tide—
following, presumably, a stroll or a swim—onto a segment of beach owned 
by the Atlantis Beach Club (“Atlantis”).65 Mr. Labrosciano proceeded to 
walk across the dry sand in an effort to leave the beach at the foot of Raleigh 
Avenue, which presented the most direct route to his home.66 Atlantis’s 
security detail asked him to stay off the beach.67 When he refused, Atlantis 
called the police and ultimately pursued a trespass charge.68 A citizens’ 
group, the Raleigh Avenue Beach Association, of which Mr. Labrosciano 
was a member, filed its own suit asserting that Atlantis was depriving people 
of their coastal access and use rights.69 The State of New Jersey immediately 
sided with the citizens’ group in charging that Atlantis’s exclusionary 
practices were inconsistent with the public trust doctrine.70 
Unlike the quasi-public beach association in Matthews, Atlantis was a 
distinctly private organization. The Raleigh Avenue court, though, took the 
significant step of extending application of the Matthews considerations to 
beaches titled in such private hands. It asserted that “reasonable access to the 
sea is integral to the public trust doctrine” and that use of the dry sand beach 
is “ancillary” to use of the ocean regardless of the identity of the party who 
holds underlying title to that beach.71 The decision rests on an evaluative 
 
 63. See E-mail from Christopher McCann to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Professor of Law & Assoc. 
Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. A&M Sch. of Law (October 3, 2020) (on file with author) (recounting 
first-hand experiences on the Habitat Paddle to Build). 
 64. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 113–25 (N.J. 2005). 
 65. Id. at 116. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. Atlantis’s demanding that Mr. Labrosciano stay off the beach is a mere illustration of the 
Atlantis’s exclusionary efforts. See, e.g., E-mail from Brian Weeks, Deputy Attorney Gen., State of N.J., 
to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. A&M Sch. of 
Law (October 1, 2020) (on file with author) (recounting, in the course of recollecting his investigative 
efforts as counsel for the State of New Jersey in the Raleigh Avenue litigation, an Atlantis security guard’s 
precluding a couple that had walked from the water across the dry sand on Atlantis’s property without 
incident from leaving the beach through Atlantis’s gate).  
 68. Raleigh Avenue, 879 A.2d at 116. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 120. The Raleigh Avenue decision stated that allowable beach fees may cover only the 
actual costs of basic beach services, including lifeguards, trash removal, showers, toilets, and 
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term—what one scholar describes as a “reasonable access norm”—that 
provokes reflection by titleholders and beachgoers alike about what behavior 
is acceptable and expected by others in a given context.72 
Raleigh Avenue’s reasonable access approach is distinct from the 
seemingly “crystalline” Texas tenet that a person who holds title to the dry-
sand portion of a beach may wall out others from that beach at will.73 It also 
differs from the facial stiffness of Oregon’s imperative in that it does not 
purport to fortify historical public uses for all time.74 Raleigh Avenue, in 
addition to reiterating the importance of the character of the property in 
evaluating the extent to which the public has rights to access and use dry 
sand beaches titled in private hands, serves as a powerful symbol for the 
proposition that no owner can exercise control over property in a way that 
unreasonably interferes with contemporary public needs concomitant to the 
enjoyment of public waterways.75 
 
administrative costs. Id. at 118, 124–25. In essence, the court approved a two-tiered fee structure: one for 
members in private facilities and one for the general public in the public area. The private club, Atlantis, 
may charge whatever the market will bear for use of its private facilities, such as cabanas, umbrellas, 
gazebos, etc., without regulation under the public trust doctrine. Such fees remain subject to other 
government police power regulations, such as taxation, consumer protection, health and safety laws, and 
regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages. However, Atlantis may not appropriate public assets and 
use them as if they were the private assets of a for-profit entity.  
 72. See ALEXANDER, supra note 21, at 180, 188–90. Upon application of the Matthews 
considerations, the Raleigh Avenue court deemed the entire Atlantis beach—approximately 480 feet in 
length along the water’s edge and 340 feet wide when measured from the water’s edge to Atlantis’s 
landward-most property line—subject to public access and use. In support of this conclusion, the Raleigh 
Avenue court pointed to the lack of a public beach in the municipality, the fact that the public accessway 
nearest Raleigh Avenue was more than a half-mile away, high demand from hundreds of residents 
immediately inland of the beach, and the longstanding prior free public use of the beach. The two 
dissenting justices generally agreed that the Matthews considerations should be extended to cases 
involving beaches titled in private hands that do not have any connection to a municipality, but, in 
applying those considerations, would have afforded the public access to and use of just a ten-foot-wide 
strip of dry sand along the length of Atlantis’s beach. See Raleigh Avenue, 879 A.2d at 125–29 (Wallace, 
J., dissenting). 
 73. See Lovett, supra note 4, at 929; Rose, supra note 25, at 578. 
 74. In this comparative sense, Raleigh Avenue makes evident that resorting to a standard does not 
automatically translate into “weaker” protection of property rights. See Lehavi, supra note 31, at 113.  
 75. The Raleigh Avenue court’s rationale mirrors in basic respects a concurring opinion by Oregon 
Supreme Court Justice Arno H. Denecke in the Oregon case of Thornton v. Hay described above. Justice 
Denecke wrote: 
I agree with the decision of the majority; however, I disagree with basing the decision upon the 
English doctrine of “customary rights.” . . . I base the public's right upon the following factors: 
(1) long usage by the public of the dry sands area, not necessarily on all the Oregon beaches, 
but wherever the public uses the beach; (2) a universal and long held belief by the public in the 
public's right to such use; (3) long and universal acquiescence by the upland owners in such 
public use; and (4) the extreme desirability to the public of the right to the use of the dry sands. 
When this combination exists, as it does here, I conclude that the public has the right to use the 
dry sands. . . . “The law regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the 
public must change as the public need changes.” 
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2.  Standards and Determinacy 
Adherents to the conventional rules-versus-standards account described 
at the outset of this Part are likely to characterize New Jersey’s reasonable 
access standard as indeterminate.76 There are at least two counter-charges to 
this characterization. First, to the extent this standard is less determinate than 
the rules of Texas and Oregon (which, as asserted above, is no foregone 
conclusion given that the scope of the Texas and Oregon rules are often 
themselves indeterminate without attention to context), it may well be 
acceptable; after all, ensuring determinacy does not trump reaching the right 
result in all circumstances. Second, though—and as this Section sets out in 
more detail below—the very charge of wholesale indeterminacy is 
misplaced.77 Just as robust exclusionary and unfettered access rules are, as 
noted above, less determinate than the conventional account makes them out 
to be, a reasonable access standard is more determinate than that account 
generally allows.78 Key precedential applications give standards of this sort 
their shape.79 The following pages offer two illustrative exemplars of how 
New Jersey’s reasonable access standard achieves some modicum of 
determinacy by reference to baseline cases.   
 
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678–79 (Or. 1969) (Denecke, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER AND ALLIED 
PROBLEMS 202 (Robert Emmet Clark ed., 1967)). 
 76. See Radin, supra note 27, at 796 (“If rules do not tie judges’ hands with their logical or analytic 
application, the traditional view is that judges will have personal discretion in how to apply the law.”). 
 77. See Singer, supra note 29, at 1387–88. 
 78. Id. at 1390. Indeed, standards may in some instances be more determinate than rules. See, e.g., 
Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Pins Jurisdiction, the Vagueness Doctrine, and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. 
L.J. 1, 31–33 (1977). 
 79. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 984–85 (“Encounters with particular cases will confound the 
view that things really have been fully settled in advance. . . . Even laws that appear confining, and quite 
rule-like, may require interpreters to give them content at the point of application.”); id. at 989 
(“[C]ategories receive their human meaning by reference to typical instances. When we are asked whether 
a particular thing falls within a general category, we examine whether that thing is like or unlike the 
typical or defining instances.”); Lehavi, supra note 31, at 87 (explaining how a standard “delegates power 
to courts to fill [the standard] with content through interpretation”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing 
Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1223 (2010) 
(suggesting that where “like circumstances have presented themselves before, and precedent has been 
established to the effect that certain specific behavior falls inside or outside the directive, the citizen may 
draw the simple analogy and follow suit”). Similarly, lawyers do not face extreme difficulties in advising 
their clients on the viability of, for instance, nuisance or negligence claims, despite the standard-like 
nature of the reasonableness provisions that drive those doctrines. See Singer, supra note 29, at 1389. 
Where core archetypes are not instructive, the moral reflection that standards prompt is a valuable feature, 
not a bug, of a standards-based approach. 
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i.  Limiting Access 
The matter of Bubis v. Kassin arose in the Village of Loch Arbour, a 
small municipality consisting of a beach approximately 300 feet deep along 
1000 feet of ocean frontage.80 Of this frontage, a private citizen, Joyce 
Kassin, held title to the southern-most 300 foot by 650 foot portion and the 
Village held title to the remainder.81 In earlier litigation, Kassin had been 
ordered to provide an access easement across her land to the water.82 In this 
follow-up suit, Sophie Bubis—who lived across the street and to the 
immediate west of Kassin—sought a declaration of her rights to use the dry 
sand portion of the Kassin property for recreational and social purposes.83 
In Bubis, an appellate court deemed it important that Kassin already 
provided a public easement allowing transit across her land to the water; 
permitted, in accord with an earlier court order, some public uses within a 
small corridor of dry sand along the entire ocean frontage of her property at 
all times; and, on the one to two days per year in which the Village’s public 
beach reaches capacity, allowed the public to use the entire beach on the 
northern-most 300 foot by 100 foot portion of her property.84 In applying 
Raleigh Avenue, the court held that Kassin need not provide public access to 
and use of the dry sand beach beyond that already provided in light of its 
findings that (1) the Village had an adjacent public beach “sufficient to 
satisfy the ‘public demand;’ ” and (2) unlike the beach club in Raleigh 
Avenue, Kassin had never used the property for commercial purposes or 
charged fees to any of her guests or members of the public, both of whom 
nevertheless benefit from the lifeguarding and other services she offers on 
the beach.85 
ii.  Extending Access 
During the period in which the Bubis litigation took place, state 
representatives—in the course of evaluating a private beach club’s routine 
dune-maintenance permit application—uncovered a document relating to 
beach access in a municipality several miles to the north of the Village of 
Loch Arbour. This document would serve as the focal point of future 
litigation over the implementation of Raleigh Avenue’s precepts.86 Via this 
 
 80. Bubis v. Kassin, 960 A.2d 779, 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 782. 
 84. Id. at 781–82, 786–87. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See E-mail from Brian Weeks, Deputy Attorney Gen., State of N.J., to Timothy M. Mulvaney, 
Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Faculty Research, Tex. A&M Sch. of Law (January 13, 2018) (on 
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document, which was signed by a representative of the beach club and an 
Assistant Commissioner in the State’s Department of Environmental 
Protection in 1993, the beach club purported to grant (1) a construction 
easement to the State to enter its property “to pump, place, transport and 
spread sand beach fill” on its property as part of a beach nourishment project; 
(2) “a continuing easement for the purpose of conducting periodic beach 
nourishment” during the anticipated duration of the project; and (3) “a 
perpetual easement for a right of limited public access” allowing only north-
south pedestrian transit along a narrow corridor at the new, post-beach-re-
nourishment water’s edge.87 The State would soon come to learn that this 
former Assistant Commissioner had signed nearly identical agreements with 
eight other private beach clubs in the Borough.88 
The State filed suit seeking reformation of these agreements in light of 
the intervening holding in Raleigh Avenue indicating that upland sand on 
property owned by a private entity is subject to reasonable public access and 
use under the public trust doctrine.89 Under the caption Chiesa v. D. Lobi 
Enterprises, an appellate panel remarked that “public policy reflects the 
common conscience and changes in its demands with the needs and widely 
held feelings of the times.”90 Sources of such public policy, explained the 
court, include judicial decisions involving “new applications of old 
principles,” like that in Raleigh Avenue.91 The court upheld a trial judge’s 
decision deeming the limited public access provision in the 1993 agreement 
“contrary to [the] public interest and unenforceable.”92 
iii.  Archetypes 
Bubis and D. Lobi Enterprises do not offer private titleholders and 
would-be beachgoers absolute certainty on the extent of beach access and 
use to which the public is entitled statewide. However, Bubis’s conclusion 
that portions of a noncommercial beach owned by a single person adjacent 
to a public beach sufficient to accommodate demand can reasonably remain 
 
file with author). 
 87. Chiesa v. D. Lobi Enters., No. A-6070-09T3, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2218, at *1 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 28, 2012). 
 88. See MaryAnn Spoto, N.J. Appellate Panel Tells Sea Bright Club It Must Open Beach to 
Everyone, NEWJERSEY.COM (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.nj.com/politics/2012/09/nj_appellate_panel_ 
tells_sea_b.html [perma.cc/6TKD-89CX]. 
 89. D. Lobi Enters., 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2218, at *1–2. 
 90. Id. at *17. 
 91. Id at *17; see also id. at *18 (“Certainly, after the Raleigh Avenue ruling, both parties to the 
1993 Agreement should have recognized that the limited public access to the 80 feet of oceanfront tidal 
property the Club owned might be questionable. . . .”).  
 92. Id. at *2. 
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part of that private owner’s exclusive domain and D. Lobi Enterprises’ 
resolution that the access and use terms set out in a 1993 agreement with 
commercial beach clubs related to a publicly-funded beach replenishment 
project were unreasonable provide shape to Raleigh Avenue’s reasonable 
access norm and the deliberations that it facilitates.93 Generalizations of this 
nature reveal that New Jersey’s reasonable access standard is not especially 
distinct from the seemingly more concrete rules common in other states, 
which, as noted above, themselves operate through interpretation of their 
scope as they are applied to resolve actual disputes.94 
C.  ON REFLECTION: DETERMINACY AND BEACH ACCESS 
The foregoing pages have explored what, on their face, are beach access 
policies that take the form of rules (grounded in robust exclusionary rights 
or unfettered access privileges) or standards (reasonable access). The former 
often are generally extolled for their determinacy, while the latter generally 
are praised for their flexibility. However, this Part has contended that these 
features are not nearly so static. When new contexts arise, a robust 
exclusionary rule or an unfettered access rule does not automatically 
determine the scope of its own application; instead, titleholders and 
beachgoers reflect on whether exclusionary or access policies apply in this 
new context and, where necessary, call on judges to determine whether to 
craft an exception, fashion a qualification, or recognize a distinction. Rules, 
that is, are less determinate (and more flexible) than they appear on their 
face. Meanwhile, standards, like New Jersey’s reasonable access approach, 
 
 93.  In this respect, the New Jersey experience mirrors that of Scotland. In 2003, Scotland passed 
a land reform act that created a presumption of “responsible access” across not only coastal areas but a 
large swath of the country’s interior. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 2(1) (“A person has 
access rights only if they are exercised responsibly.”). The statute relied on context-sensitive standards to 
address several key issues, including the extent to which landowners can claim a right of privacy around 
their dwellings that eclipses the right of responsible access and make decisions about land uses that might 
impede unrestrained access. See John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 777–90 (2011). The Scottish courts have, over time, given 
these standards content. Id. at 790–815. After an especially thorough exposition of the Scottish courts’ 
engagement, Professor Lovett concludes that “a property regime that pivots on an ex ante presumption of 
access can incorporate exceptions to this presumption that employ open-textured standards of 
reasonableness,” id. at 817, without generating unnecessarily high “information processing costs and 
coordination costs” that critics anticipated at the outset, id. at 742. 
 94. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
611–16 (1992). John Lovett asserts that “litigants (and their lawyers) who confront broad standards just 
after their enactment bear considerably higher litigation and uncertainty costs than do litigants who 
confront the same standards 20 or 30 years later, after the courts (and the legislature) have chiseled them 
down into more crystalline rules.” Lovett, supra note 4, at 929. But see Radin, supra note 27, at 814–15 
(contending that strong social agreement in advance of the development of case law can serve as a 
sufficient marker).  
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that appear open-ended take shape through applications that reveal core 
archetypes and, therefore, result in “holdings” that take a form similar to the 
rules that were thought to be so clear in Oregon and Texas. In sum, then, a 
state’s options on how to allocate property interests at the water’s edge—be 
it via a regime of robust exclusionary rights, unfettered access privileges, or 
reasonable access—are more similar than the conventional account allows. 
II.  RULES AND STANDARDS: TRANSPARENCY 
The previous Part issued a challenge in the beach access context to the 
conventional view that rule-like systems are far superior to standard-like 
systems with regards to the extent to which they produce determinate 
outcomes. Despite the stark variations in the form and substance of these 
legal directives on their face, rule-like systems—as illustrated by the beach 
access laws of Texas and Oregon—in actuality do not, respectively, ignore 
the value of beaches as fora for sociability or deem that value of such 
significance that it trumps all others in all cases. Similarly, standard-based 
systems—as exemplified by New Jersey’s beach access law—do not leave 
everything up for grabs; rather, some semblance of determinacy emerges 
through applications of the standards in core cases. 
If, indeed, these various jurisdictional approaches to beach access are 
more similar than the conventional determinacy thesis suggests, how else 
might the approaches be meaningfully distinguished? One possibility, 
emphasized here, lies in the virtue of transparency.95 The first Section below 
explains that rule-like systems have been lauded for their transparency, in 
the sense that they are more likely to lead decisionmakers to treat like cases 
alike and thereby minimize arbitrariness or bias.96 The second Section 
contends, though, that standard-based systems offer their own version of 
transparency that is grounded in promoting dialogue, demanding 
accountability, and insisting on justification. Rules may not be transparent in 
these ways that standards are because rule interpretation, if presented as mere 
rule application, may obfuscate the reasons for applying or distinguishing a 
rule in a hard case. 
A.  THE TRANSPARENCY OF BEACH ACCESS RULES 
Some scholars would understand beach access rules as tending to 
declare the meaning of any operative principles upfront and, thereafter, 
 
 95. For one of many concise, insightful summaries of the wide range of abstract arguments for and 
against the pro-rules and pro-standards positions, see KELMAN, supra note 26, at 40–45. 
 96. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 69 
(1983). 
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concentrate decisionmaking on neutral categorizations that are based on ex 
ante conditions.97 Such an approach allows those operative principles to self-
implement—independently and objectively—moving forward,98 rather than 
opening the door to judicial creativity and arbitrariness.99 This transparency 
of rules leads to impartial decisionmaking.100 Through mechanical 
enforcement of a robust exclusionary rule or an unfettered access rule, all are 
equally protected by law, for each similarly situated person is sure to be 
treated alike where cases are decided prospectively. The value, then, of these 
rules is that they give those persons potentially impacted by a beach access 
policy warning as to whether or not a legal directive will apply to their 
courses of conduct.101 Moreover, merely avoiding the appearance of 
arbitrariness may itself be of some value, in that it helps to maintain 
potentially impacted persons’ confidence in the system of democratic 
lawmaking more generally.102 
Caution is, of course, necessary to assure that the transparency benefits 
of rules of this sort are not overstated. The claim that rules are transparent is 
based on several assumptions, including that rules unambiguously mean 
exactly what they say, that they are complete and resolve all disputes within 
their domain, and that they are, therefore, honest about the considerations 
that go into dividing cases to which a given rule is applicable from cases to 
which that rule is not. That a rule requires similarly situated persons to be 
treated similarly is a positive trait as far as it goes; however, those 
implementing such a rule will face the immediate complication of having to 
 
 97. See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 
322 (1985); see also Lovett, supra note 4, at 937 (explaining the conventional view); Pierre Schlag, Rules 
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985) (same). 
 98. See Radin, supra note 27, at 793–95 (describing this “deductive” or “analytic” view of a rule 
as “self-applying to the set of particulars said to fall under it”); Sullivan, supra note 25, at 58 (portraying 
this view in similar terms). 
 99. See Schlag, supra note 97, at 390–91. 
 100. See F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 220–33 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 2011 ed. 
1960) (associating rules with an impartiality norm); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1688; Shiffrin, supra note 
79, at 1214 (“Other things being equal, rules, understood as legal directives that instruct ‘a decision-
maker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts,’ offer precision and 
transparency.” (quoting Sullivan, supra note 25, at 58)); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 974; FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 149–55 (2009). 
 101. See SCHAUER, supra note 100, at 194–98.  
 102. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989) 
(“When one is dealing . . . with issues so heartfelt that they are believed by one side or the other to be 
resolved by the Constitution itself, it does not greatly appeal to one’s sense of justice to say: ‘Well, that 
earlier case had nine factors, this one has nine plus one.’ Much better, even at the expense of the mild 
substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that 
one can point to in explanation of the decision.”). 
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determine whether persons are, in fact, similarly situated.103 Applying a rule 
in a hard case requires interpretation, which, in turn, requires resorting to 
reasons that are outside the rule itself.  
By not demanding an open, particularized assessment on that score in a 
judicial opinion, rules conceivably may actually inhibit the transparency of 
law rather than advance it.104 If judges need not give reasons for interpreting 
a rule in one way rather than another, they simply can phrase the rule in a 
way that decides the case before them without openly acknowledging that 
their phrasing of that rule is an interpretation, elaboration, or specification of 
the original rule, whose creators did not include the detail necessary to decide 
its application in this new case.  
It follows, therefore, that siding with a rule-based approach, such as 
robust exclusion or unfettered access, may be most accurately understood as 
a determination that the risk of injustice from the inherent limitations of 
deciding similar situatedness case-by-case exceeds the risk of injustice from 
the arbitrariness of over- and under-inclusiveness that can result from 
applying these rules in a rather rigid fashion.105 Rules, proponents argue, are 
transparent about this determination—transparent about this choice—at the 
outset.106 
B.  THE TRANSPARENCY OF BEACH ACCESS STANDARDS 
Standards, however, are characterized by their own less-celebrated 
though still robust version of transparency. Understanding this latter version 
of transparency begins with an appreciation for the rudimentary idea that 
recognizing one party’s claim to a property interest regularly has the effect 
of rejecting or limiting the claims of others.107 After all, according to 
 
 103. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 994 (“A familiar understanding of equality requires the 
similarly situated to be treated the same; a less familiar but also important understanding requires the 
differently situated to be treated differently, also in the interest of equality.”).  
 104. See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, 
Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1456–62 (2008) 
(discussing the possibility that the application of rules without regard to their normative justification or 
concern for the specific context in which they are being applied may lead to unjust results); Sunstein, 
supra note 17, at 975. 
 105. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 62; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 990. 
 106. Even taking the proponents’ position at face value, this is not always the case. Jeremy Bentham 
famously—or infamously—advocated promoting among the public the view that the law consists of rules, 
while recognizing that, covertly, the law actually consists of standards on which judges reflect in 
operating the court system. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, 195–
96 (2d ed. 2019). 
 107. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, A World of Distrust, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 153, 156–57 (2020); 
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 941; Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-
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landowners increased legal power to intensify land uses unavoidably 
requires them to surrender their ability to halt activities by others that 
interfere with those uses.108 Given that there are almost always property 
claims on both sides when considering the meaning of ownership, the 
unavoidable task for lawmakers is to decide which actions to safeguard and 
which actions to restrain.109 There is, in the words of Eric Freyfogle, “no 
morally neutral place . . . to hide” when it comes to allocating property 
interests.110 
A reasonable access approach to the beachfront makes visible and 
affirms, rather than obscures and denies, judges’ responsibility to reach via 
normative reasoning the type of allocative decision required to resolve 
parties’ competing claims to the dry sand, both because judges have to think 
about reasons and because they have to explain that reasoning in written 
opinions that require articulation of otherwise inchoate and intuitive 
judgments.111 It accomplishes this end by applying pressure in two 
 
Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 165–66 (2018); see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and 
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 13 (1927) (“[D]ominion over things is . . . imperium over our fellow 
human beings.”). Other rights, such as free speech, often are not “rivalrous” in this sense. See Laura S. 
Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1996).  
 108. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 43, 50 
(David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011) (explaining that, in such an instance, property rights do not 
increase overall but rather are “simply reconfigured”); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as 
Relationship, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 1, 17 (1993) (“ ‘[P]rivate rights’ always have social consequences.”); 
Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the Infrastructure of Democracy 10 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11-16), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1832829 (citing 
the “principle of noncontradiction” that “all owners must be limited in what they can do on their land so 
that all owners can have quiet enjoyment of their land”); Joseph William Singer, Something Important in 
Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 111 (2002) (“[N]o meaningful fairness argument can be 
wholly nonconsequentialist.”). For this reason, framing adjustments in property laws as “strengthening” 
or “weakening” individual property claims can be misleading and counter-productive. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449, 492–501 (2010). 
 109. See C.B. Macpherson, Liberal-Democracy and Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND 
CRITICAL POSITIONS 199, 201 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) (juxtaposing the “individual right to exclude” 
with the “individual right to equal access”); Sanne H. Knudsen, Remedying the Misuse of Nature, 2012 
UTAH L. REV. 141, 151 (suggesting that addressing the “uncomfortable and unclear question” of “where 
to draw the line between [land] use and misuse” is “inevitable given that people and nature are 
intertwined”); Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality & Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 
LOY. L. REV. 243, 258 (2006) (“[R]egulations are generally designed to limit one person’s freedom to 
protect another’s freedom. In such cases, the question is not whether government should intervene but on 
whose behalf it should do so.”). 
 110. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 84 (2010); see also 
Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 161, 201 
(1996) (arguing that “[n]o model of property avoids value choice[s]”).  
 111. See, e.g., Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the 
Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 825–26 (1962); see also ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD 265 (2003) (“Good reasoning is often stimulated when 
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directions. From one direction, this approach eliminates the facade of judges 
being able to hide behind a robust exclusion or unfettered access rule as if 
that rule’s application is an objective, neutral act that need not be justified in 
service of the common good.112 From the other direction, it gives comfort to 
judges who might feel hamstrung by a rigid rule behind which they would 
prefer not to hide.113 
Relatedly, a reasonable access approach prompts judges—“create[s] a 
habit of mind”114—to consider the perspective of anyone who might be 
affected by the allocation of the exclusionary and access interests at stake.115 
Such an approach encourages—indeed, forces—courts to analyze cases 
openly, in a manner that elicits direct discussion.116 Consider, for instance, a 
scenario—hypothetical here, though disturbingly reminiscent of behavior in 
many coastal communities in the not-so-distant past—in which the 
aforementioned Kassin’s efforts were part of a covert pattern by private 
titleholders in a homogenous coastal community to intimidate a subset of 
would-be beachgoers from more diverse inland communities on the basis of 
race.117 Here, Kassin’s exclusionary tactic is not aimed so much at a 
 
lawmakers take the time to explain why they did what they did. . . .”). 
 112. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 18 (1992); see also Radin, supra note 27, at 813. In Frank Michelman’s 
words, such an approach calls on judges to “confront the parties in the flesh.” Frank I. Michelman, 
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35 (1986). A rigid, rule-based approach, on 
the other hand, allows the “deferment” of concerns. See Schlag, supra note 97, at 411. 
 113. See, e.g., David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 414 
(2015). 
 114. See Sullivan, supra note 25, at 69. 
 115. Cf. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 60–70 (1990) (characterizing productive deliberation as that consisting of the 
consideration of multiple perspectives). 
 116. Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 1226–27 (“The process by which deliberation affects behavior and 
articulates cognition may be more akin to a slow, sometimes clogged, drip than to a quick, direct 
injection.”).  
 117. Past public and private discrimination in this context—through supposedly color-blind and 
race-neutral residency restrictions, beach fee policies, parking limitations, prohibitions on wearing 
swimwear on local streets or eating on the beach, the creation of members-only coastal associations, and 
the like—has been masterfully documented by Marc Poirier and Andrew Kahrl, among others. See 
ANDREW W. KAHRL, FREE THE BEACHES: THE STORY OF NED COLL AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S 
MOST EXCLUSIVE SHORELINE 12–13 (2018); ANDREW W. KAHRL, THE LAND WAS OURS: HOW BLACK 
BEACHES BECAME WHITE WEALTH IN THE COASTAL SOUTH 4–6 (2012); Marc R. Poirier, Environmental 
Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property 
and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719 (1996); see also Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law 
Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 369, 393 n.171 (1973) (“One would have 
to live in a vacuum not to suspect that many beach restrictions are based in part on racial motivation, 
intermingled with the idea of building a wall between city and suburb.”); REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF 
WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD: YOUNG PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S LONG STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 181 (2009) (“Recreational facilities were one of the most common ways that young people 
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“private” versus “public” conflict akin to that at issue in the actual matter of 
Bubis v. Kassin as it is on an identity-defining version of “resident” versus 
“nonresident” conflict.118 In this hypothetical context, then, a decision on 
whether Kassin must provide additional public access to and use of the dry 
sand beach to which she holds private title is not considering the value of 
promoting sociability generally, but on challenging an insidious, divisive, 
and prejudiced form of sociability.119 While a rule often presumptively 
equates the powers that rule confers with reason and can thus blind us to 
potentially unjust uses of those powers, a standard openly triggers a demand 
for reason-giving on the uses of powers by the likes of this hypothetical 
Kassin along a continuum from legitimate to oppressive.120 
By providing lucidity on all that is at stake, the reasonable access 
approach calls for upfront conversation and communication on what makes 
access valuable and how that value ought to be considered in the face of any 
downsides that might come with sacrificing the titleholder’s ability to 
exclude.121 Rather than leaving judges with the option of carving out 
exceptions to rules or distinguishing their applications—an option that some 
judges may not have the confidence to exercise, even if they see the latent 
contradictory principles that underlie most all property conflicts—the 
reasonable access approach compels open contemplation every time with 
regards to any shifting understandings of what expectations are legitimate, 
what distribution of opportunities is appropriate, which exercises of which 
powers are justifiable, and what obligations are fair to assume that we, as 
citizens, owe to each other.122 Rather than dissociating the task at hand from 
these inquiries or masking them behind a cloud, a standards-based regime 
 
collectively experienced Jim Crow.”). 
 118. See Poirier, supra note 117, at 743–44 (“[T]he shore municipalities often limited beach use to 
a town’s residents, or put beach fees or other barriers in the way of nonresidents’ use of town beaches.”). 
 119. See Poirier, supra note 21, at 105–06, 118 (suggesting that a general requirement of reasonable 
access can counter discriminatory efforts without having to confront the challenges in applying extant 
constitutional and statutory antidiscrimination protections). 
 120. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 535 (1988) (book 
review). 
 121. See Poirier, supra note 21, at 97–99 (“Different uses are congestible in different ways; one 
owner’s highly desired oil transshipping facility may have down sides acceptable to her, but affect nearby 
owners’ and other stakeholders’ homes and fishing in ways that make them unhappy.”). 
 122. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK 
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 49–50 (1986) (“[T]he only thing remotely like a solution [to a moral 
dilemma] is, in fact, to describe and see the conflict clearly and to acknowledge that there is no way 
out.”); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1773 (contending that a standard “denies the judge the right to apply 
rules without looking over his shoulder at the results”); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An 
Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (book review) (contending that formal rules 
promote “substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that radically separates law from politics, 
means from ends, processes from outcomes”).  
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consistently brings these inquiries to the fore.123 
Enhanced transparency touches not only judges but individual actors in 
social and market settings. A robust exclusionary rule or an unfettered access 
rule can create, in the words of Morton Horwitz, a “consciousness that 
radically separates law from politics.”124 Such messaging suggests that 
beachgoers and titleholders may well be less prone to put themselves in a 
position where, ultimately, they might have to ask a judge, respectively, to 
carve out an exception or to recognize a distinction to what they have been 
led to believe is a firm robust exclusionary rule or unfettered access rule than 
they would be to ask a judge to apply a reasonable access standard.125 The 
substance of the law in a rule-like regime therefore may have a propensity to 
be less “full” and, in turn, less contemporarily sharp than that in a standard-
based regime.126 A standard-based regime recognizes and confronts the 
impermanency of the powers conferred by law, prompting lawsuits focused 
on justifying the exercise of power on select occasion, but, far more 
commonly, encouraging ongoing mutual engagement and honest dialogue 
on competing perspectives outside the courtroom.127 In effect, the 
 
 123. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 122, at 50. Of course, rules can at times make it easier for judges 
to stand by positions that are unpopular with the majority when they should do so. Scalia, supra note 102, 
at 1180; Sunstein, supra note 17, at 975. 
 124. See Horwitz, supra note 122, at 566. 
 125. Carol Rose implicitly makes this point in the course of discussing the unequal distribution of 
knowledge and access to information. See Rose, supra note 25, at 600. My raising it here is not to deny 
the reality that litigation is extremely costly and, therefore—even with robust legal aid services, non-
profit ventures, public advocates’ offices, and the like—can lead to extensive inequalities if it is relied 
upon too heavily as either a shield or a sword. See Sunstein, supra note 17, at 977. A related point is that 
one’s conception of a rule or standard inevitably will be a product of the extent to which that rule or 
standard is enforced. See KELMAN, supra note 26, at 49–50. Louis Kaplow addresses the question of cost 
from a different angle. Kaplow, supra note 94, at 557. Kaplow suggests that, generally, rules are more 
expensive to create than standards but standards are costlier for individuals to interpret when deciding 
how to conduct themselves and for adjudicators to apply to prior conduct. Id. at 562–63. In Kaplow’s 
view, it follows that rules are economically efficient where the rules will be implicated frequently and in 
substantially similar settings. Id. at 563. But see Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring 
of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 8 (1993) (suggesting that transparent standards create 
an inexpensive way of “gaining a rough idea of the law’s content”).  
 126. See Michelman, supra note 112, at 34–36 (discussing how balancing tests engage judges in 
transparent forms of public reason and, in turn, how judicial engagement prompts public engagement). 
 127. See Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 1217 (“For the people to whom they apply . . . , open-ended 
standards may encourage greater levels of moral deliberation than would clear guidelines.”); id. at 1222-
25 (“I contend that the uncertainty of application is, in the appropriate context, among [a standard’s] 
virtues because it requires that the citizen who aims to be compliant, whether from motives of justice or 
motives of prudence, grapple with the relevant moral concepts directly.”); see also KELMAN, supra note 
26, at 62 (“A reliance on standards is premised on the hope of moral dialogue and ultimate 
consensus. . . . Rules do not depend on ongoing dialogue to gain dimension or content.”). Much like the 
Scottish experience is instructive with respect to issues of determinacy, see supra note 93, that experience 
is instructive with respect to transparency, too. As one commentator describes it, the reality that a good 
1_MULVANEY_JCI_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/17/21  9:51 PM 
30 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1 
 
communication stimulated by a standard-based regime both allows for the 
expression of competing social visions and disciplines those expressions.128 
The combination of impacts—on judges and members of the public—
stemming from the transparency of a reasonable access approach can create 
a constructive cycle of sorts: judges, by forthrightly reciting and analyzing 
the interests on all sides of exclusion/access disputes and explaining the 
justifications for their allocative choices amidst competing claims, can drive 
public engagement and discussion; in turn, such public engagement and 
discussion can—given the communal and contemporary nature of any 
reasonableness standard129—shape the decisions made by judges in related 
cases in the future.130 Requiring judges to explain why access or 
exclusionary interests are entitled to protection lays to bare their value 
judgments and any assumptions on which those judgments rest, thereby 
subjecting them to meaningful scrutiny by other courts and the public at 
large.131 It also controls choice in the following way: having to explain 
something to others may deter judges from initial intuitions when, despite 
their best efforts, the opinion just “will not write” in the sense that they 
realize that they cannot present arguments in a way that is convincing given 
the counterarguments that must be addressed. Writing the reasoning down 
can, therefore, change the result by giving judges an impetus to change their 
minds. In turn, then, a reasonable access approach increases the likelihood 
that those who do not prevail in an access dispute will be offered a 
justification that, however hard to swallow, should be accepted by reasonable 
persons in their shoes under the circumstances. 
 
deal of Scotland is subject to access encourages “landowners, access takers, and local officials . . . to enter 
into a long term, evolving dialogue about how to accommodate each other’s needs—landowner’s 
legitimate management interests, homeowners’ privacy and personal enjoyment needs, and the public’s 
interest in responsible access taking.” Lovett, supra note 93, at 782. 
 128. See Singer, supra note 120, at 543. 
 129. See KELMAN, supra note 26, at 61 (“A typical standard (‘Don’t act unreasonably,’ ‘Enforce 
fair bargains’) requires that the enforcing community . . . can come to some consensus on the meaning of 
the value term, that the group can come to share a conception of reasonableness or fairness.”) 
 130. See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1528–33 (1988) (explaining how 
interpretations of constitutional provisions that lack precision can interact in constructive ways with 
political movements and citizen engagement); Shiffrin, supra note 79, at 1126 (explaining how standards 
can be understood to “partially delegate authority back to citizens”); Sunstein, supra note 17, at 958 
(suggesting that contextualized decisionmaking seek to “make space for the democratic goals of 
participation and responsiveness”). 
 131. But see David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules 
and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 428 (2013) (describing rules’ propensity to drive the “transparency 
of discretion . . . underground”). 
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C.  ON REFLECTION: TRANSPARENCY AND BEACH ACCESS 
Highlighting the transparency virtues of a reasonable access regime—
promoting dialogue, demanding accountability, and insisting on 
justification—is not meant to endorse the view that standards-based 
approaches are superior to rule-like approaches in all circumstances,132 that 
standards necessarily reveal value judgments,133 or that rule-like approaches 
necessarily suppress or conceal those judgments.134 In some contexts, courts 
could directly address foundational normative principles in the application 
of a rule over time, such that the transparency gains from resorting to a 
standard are quite minimal; in others, a standard could be so opaque in 
operation that it is not prompting the type of justificatory conversation touted 
here;135 and, in still others, nontransparency virtues of rules may supersede 
the collective virtues of siding with standards. This highlighting exercise 
does, though, support the claim that the transparency virtues of beach access 
standards deserve attention. A transparent standards-based framework 
cannot absolutely guarantee a more rational and intelligible doctrinal 
framework. However, it seems sufficiently apt, at least generally, to establish 
the conditions under which such rationality and intelligibility can emerge, 
for it puts on the table the value judgments at stake for all to see.136 
 
 132. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 26, at 20 (“[N]o polar position has such killer force as to negate 
utterly its opposite.”). 
 133. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1741 (explaining that the application of a standard could be done 
in a way that “smuggl[es] in [a] substantive policy the lawmaker had rejected”). 
 134 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 25, at 607 (suggesting that “there is a much softer, more 
sociable . . . side to crystal rules and to the commerce that accompanied their development,” which “[a]t 
least some Enlightenment thinkers thought . . . would enlarge sociability and . . . be a constitutive force 
in ever larger communities of ‘interest’ ”). Transparent choices could, of course, be made by a legislature 
and incorporated into a clearly written statute that operates in a rule-like fashion. For instance, in most 
states, the state legislature has confirmed that the area between the mean low-tide line and the mean high-
tide line is impressed with public rights. See Kehoe, supra note 3. Even there, though, the rule is not 
unequivocal; for instance, public access to the foreshore may be limited in select locales under certain 
conditions in the interests of national security. See, e.g., SUSAN M. KENNEDY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
BEACH ACCESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY 20 (Tony MacDonald ed., 2017), 
https://www.monmouth.edu/uci/documents/2018/10/beach-access-report.pdf [perma.cc/UE33-SWJB]. 
 135. Indeed, the Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause to 
void enforcement of statutes that are unacceptably vague. See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 
385, 391 (1926). 
 136. See Han, supra note 113, at 362. Beach access, of course, loses its salience where the beach is 
no longer. Conservative estimates suggest that sea levels in the United States will rise two feet, on 
average, by the year 2100; other estimates forecast a rise of anywhere from six to eleven feet. See NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SEA LEVEL RISE SCENARIOS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 3 (Jan. 2017), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Re 
gional_SLR_Scenarios_for_the_US_final.pdf [perma.cc/4QQQ-SNTR]; Robert M. DeConto & David 
Pollard, Contribution of Antarctica to Past and Future Sea-Level Rise, NATURE, March 2016, at 591–
597. On undeveloped shores, dune and beach ecosystems naturally migrate landward as sea levels rise 
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CONCLUSION 
In the conventional terms of the long-running debate surrounding the 
design of legal directives, “rules” bring a determinacy and transparency to 
the law that “standards” sacrifice in the interest of accommodating the 
complexities of individual cases. On their face, the allocations of rights and 
privileges with respect to nearly all dry sand beaches in the United States fall 
decidedly into the rules camp, for they categorically determine whom to wall 
in and whom to wall out. In Hohfeldian terms,137 the private titleholder to 
 
and other impacts of climate change rear their heads. However, the ever-expanding presence of hardened 
structures near the water’s edge along so much of the U.S. coastline drastically interferes with this 
migration pattern. ORRIN H. PILKEY & J. ANDREW G. COOPER, THE LAST BEACH 14–16, 49 (2014). In 
some instances, this migration is halted by pre-existing and, in hindsight, ill-advised residential and 
commercial development that, for political and other reasons, is now difficult to phase out; in others, 
though, the migration is halted by “coastal protection” measures erected for this very purpose. Id. at 44–
77. For a contemporary example of the latter, the federal government recently partnered with the State of 
Texas to propose construction of a one hundred-mile long, gated barrier that would lie both in and 
alongside the Gulf of Mexico in an effort to provide temporary protection for existing coastal structures 
and businesses against the increasing dangers of rising seas and storm surges. See Nick Powell, Army 
Corps Gives Nod to $31B ‘Ike Dike’ Plan for Texas Coast, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Army-Corps-gives-nod-to-31B-
Ike-Dike-plan-13340756.php#article-comments [https://perma.cc/SA7N-843M]. 
  All hardened structures—from homes and businesses to gated barriers—have a propensity to 
promote widespread erosion on their seaward side and thereby threaten the existence of dry sand beaches. 
See, e.g., James R. Drabick, Note, “Private” Public Nuisance and Climate Change: Working Within, and 
Around, the Special Injury Rule, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 535 (2005). These structures operate 
to transfer wave and water energy to the beach, rather than allowing it to dissipate and fluctuate naturally. 
See generally PITFALLS OF SHORELINE STABILIZATION: SELECTED CASE STUDIES (J. Andrew G. Cooper 
& Orrin H. Pilkey eds., 2012). The concentrated energy rebounds off the face of the structures and whisks 
sand into the sea, reducing the size of the beach. See id. at 50. At the same time, these structures can 
prevent natural sand replacement from rivers and coastal bluffs. Id. at 51. In total, then, the rebalancing 
process of the beach across the seasons is thus inhibited. Id. at 65, 67. With increased erosion and reduced 
sand supply, the beach in front of a hardened structure will retreat to the base of that structure until no 
dry sand beach remains, cutting off the public’s ability to use that beach and choking transit to any 
neighboring beaches that survive. See Orrin H. Pilkey & Howard L. Wright III, Seawalls Versus Beaches, 
J. COASTAL RES. (SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4) 41, 63 (1988) (“Comparison of totally stabilized and totally 
unstabilized reaches of individual barriers indicates that dry beach width is consistently narrower in front 
of hard stabilization.”). 
  Decisionmakers, both public and private, face hard choices in the face of competing claims by 
coastal landowners and the rights of the public along a coastline that is under marked threat from sea-
level rise and other climate-induced phenomena. When compared to the potentially discussion-halting 
consequences of what on their face are rule-like beach access regimes, it seems possible that a transparent 
approach to resolving competing claims at the water’s edge—one that demands frank discussion on the 
justifications for affording access and promoting exclusivity—might provide greater assurance that the 
issue of beaches will, at minimum, be among other matters of consideration in the development of policies 
to adapt to and mitigate the effects of sea-level rise and other phenomena associated with a changing 
climate. 
 137. In a pair of highly influential articles published over a century ago, Wesley Hohfeld developed 
an analytical framework for understanding interests in property as relational pairs. See Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 
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the dry sand beach in most jurisdictions—including, as illustrated herein, 
Texas—holds a robust right to exclude others without cause and the public 
correlatively holds no privileges of access and use; meanwhile, in select 
states, such as Oregon, the public holds an unfettered privilege to access and 
use beaches and the private titleholder holds no right to exclude. An outlier 
in following a standards-based approach, New Jersey allocates to the public 
reasonable access and use privileges and, in turn, accords private titleholders 
a right to exclude those who enter unreasonably.138 
This Article has contended that the implementation of these beach 
access policies illustrates the familiar limitations of the conventional rules-
versus-standards account in two elucidating ways. First, in terms of 
determinacy, deciding whether a given beach access rule applies has required 
contextualized assessment; likewise, standards pertaining to beach access 
have taken shape through applications in archetypical cases. That the 
question of reasonable access is asked directly in New Jersey, while, in the 
likes of Texas and Oregon, it takes the form of indirectly asking whether it 
would be reasonable to craft an exception, fashion a qualification, or 
recognize a distinction with regards to the extant rule, does only marginal 
work in distinguishing these jurisdictional approaches. Second, as to 
transparency, while rules admittedly require decisionmakers to treat like 
cases alike and thereby minimize some forms of arbitrariness, standards offer 
their own robust version of transparency, which is grounded in promoting 
dialogue, demanding accountability, and insisting on justification. 
That this Article celebrates the determinacy and transparency features 
of standards should not be understood as endorsing the view that, in all 
circumstances, standards necessarily are superior to rules, standards 
necessarily reveal value judgments, or rules necessarily suppress or conceal 
those judgments.139 Rules undoubtedly have their place. At the same time, 
though, they cannot be instinctively understood as a panacea for resolving 
 
(1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). Under this framework, if one individual holds a specific 
entitlement (a right, privilege, power, or immunity), the other person involved in that relationship holds 
the opposite of that entitlement (correlatively, a duty, no-right, liability, or disability).  
 138. Where “hardly any corner of property law is immune from the inexorable tendency of 
lawmakers to demand that people act reasonably,” the fact that New Jersey is one of just two states to 
require reasonable access to the beach indicates that beach access law has not reflected a more general 
trend in property law. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & BRADLEY C. KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, 
GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON GOOD 804 (2012). 
 139. Indeed, according to Mark Kelman, “there will remain in any legal dispute a logically or 
empirically unanswerable formal problem, that granting substantially greater discretion or limiting 
discretion through significantly greater rule boundedness in the formation of the prevailing legal 
command is always perfectly plausible.” KELMAN, supra note 26, at 16. 
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all conflicts or left to operate in a manner that ignores the possibility that, in 
their implementation, unfairness can result and dominating hierarchies can 
perpetuate. A reasonable access standard in the beachfront context charts a 
path that is sensitive, over time, to the value of determinacy but is 
simultaneously transparent in its engagement with contemporary human 
needs. In a given jurisdictional context, it may or may not be a path worth 
emulating; to reject a reasonable access standard out of hand, though, is to 
ignore the sacrifices that decision requires. 
